SNIFFY TYPES disdain the notion of “the global south,” which has exploded into something of a meme in recent years. Its inadequacies are obvious: three words could never capture the complexities of a group of more than 100 countries spread from Morocco to Malaysia and beyond. But the phrase has been adopted by Joe Biden, Emmanuel Macron and Xi Jinping.
The simplest working definition is that it refers to the majority of non-Western countries. Its use also denotes how emerging economies want more power over global affairs and often have a critical view of Western policy. Thus the global south is said to be outraged by the war in Gaza, and unhappy about Western decisions on Ukraine, co-19 and climate policy. Sarang Shidore of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, an American think-tank, says “the global south exists not as a coherent, organised grouping so much as a geopolitical fact.”
If the global south exists, sort of, then who leads it? Narendra Modi has suggested India could be the “voice of the global south”. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the president of Brazil (known as Lula), reckons his country could be, too. To examine this question we have worked with a group of scholars to crunch data on trade, financial and diplomatic links. Our conclusion is, counterintuitively, that America still has the most influence of anyone over the global south, but that within the grouping itself China has become the most powerful member by far—giving Mr Xi the strongest claim to leadership. The sting is that China’s influence has glaring limits, and could even backfire. Meanwhile other powers are on the rise.
We worked with the Pardee Centre for International Futures (PCIF) at the University of Denver. It has built an index of states’ power from 1960 to 2022. The main metric is catchily known as “formal bilateral influence capacity”, a measure of how much power country A may have over country B, based on two dimensions. First, “bandwidth”, or the extent of connections back and forth: the volume of trade, diplomatic representation and so on. Second, “dependence”: how much country B depends on country A for arms, loans, investment, etc. More connections mean more chances for country A to exert influence—and asymmetry in power makes it easier to do so. Think of China’s power over Pakistan, for instance: there are both lots of connections and China has ample asymmetric influence. The exercise examines power relations among the 130-odd members of the global south found in the G77, a UN grouping.
America has been the country with the most influence over the G77 since the 1970s (see chart 1). Its “influence capacity” has been more or less constant even as the lure of the former colonial powers, Britain and France, has waned. But it is increasingly rivalled by China, which after 40 years of relative insignificance saw its influence grow from around 2000. According to the index, China’s “influence capacity” over the G77 is roughly double that of France, the third-most influential country, and around three times that of Britain, India or the UAE.
China wields the most influence in 31 countries. Its clout is greatest in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Russia and several states in South-East Asia. By contrast the next-most powerful member of the global south, India, is top dog with only six G77 members. According to an earlier analysis by PCIF, from 1992 to 2020 the number of countries over which China had more influence than America almost doubled, from 33 to 61. The United States remains pre-eminent in the Americas. But China has extended its influence in Africa and Asia.
The emporium of everything
Recently, China has become a lot keener on the idea of the global south. Last year Mr Xi and senior Chinese officials began referring to China as part of the “global south”, a description they had hitherto resisted (the term is credited to an American left-wing academic in the 1960s), in favour of phrases like “family of developing countries”. The semantic shift reflects an attempt to define the phrase in anti-Western and Chinese-led terms. In September, China published proposals on changing international institutions, rules and laws. It claimed this was a vision of “true multilateralism” where “universal security” replaced “universal values”—in other words, one not run by an interfering West. Last year China’s then foreign minister argued that the main die in the world was not democracy versus autocracy, as Mr Biden has implied, but “between development and containment of development, and between global justice and power politics”.
China is intensely strategic about winning influence, by targeting swing states with infrastructure support, financing and more. From 2000 to 2021 it funded more than 20,000 infrastructure projects, many of which were under the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI), across 165 countries with aid or credit worth $1.3trn. Some analysts have noted data showing that credit from large state-backed lenders such as the Export-Import Bank of China is drying up. But a paper published in November by AidData, a group from William & Mary university, argues otherwise. “Contrary to conventional wisdom, Beijing is not in retreat,” says Bradley Parks, one of the authors. The paper finds that there are many many more entities extending credit to the developing world today: in 2021 it counts lending of $80bn a year. “[China] remains the single largest source of international development finance in the world.”
China is targeting geopolitical fence-sitters. AidData reckons that around two-thirds of Chinese financing goes to “toss-up” countries where neither China nor America clearly holds sway. The group has identified a quid pro quo: if a foreign government increases its share of votes at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) that align with China’s by 10 percentage points, it can expect a 276% increase, on average, in financing from Beijing. China has also used its weight to curry favour on subjects such as its repression in Xinjiang. From 2000 to 2021 “low- and middle-income countries” voted on foreign-policy decisions with China 75% of the time at the UNGA. The impact of China’s raw power was on show last year at the BRICS summit, too, where it successfully pushed for five new members of the bloc.
China uses other tools, too. It is the main trading partner of more than 120 countries. It has proed $240bn, mostly since 2016, in emergency financing of the sort the IMF specialises in. China also builds infrastructure projects quickly in developing countries, pleasing their elites, and subsidises the roll-out of digital technologies such as those of Huawei. Over the past five years it has overtaken Russia as the main source of weapons for sub-Saharan Africa.
Buyer’s remorse
Though China’s leadership position among the G77 is formidable, it faces problems. First, its influence is limited in reach and intensity. It has yet to achieve a leading position in Latin America. And across the global south it has yet to win hearts and minds decisively. Polls show split support for America and China in developing countries. Afrobarometer, which monitors public opinion in Africa, has noted a dip in the share of those with positive views of America. Yet that figure was still 49% in 2022 (albeit down from 60% in 2019). Last month a survey in South-East Asia asked respondents whom they would rather their country align in the event of a new cold war: 50.5% of respondents picked China; 49.5% chose America. When asked what countries should do about Sino-American rivalry, most opted against picking a side.
China’s conduct and political values may stunt its influence. Its actions in business and politics have attracted calls for accountability. Countries sometimes lay the blame for their debt crises at China’s door. In Congo and other resource-rich countries Chinese miners face the same charges of exploitation as Westerners do (and often worse). China’s disdain for values-based interactions (it preaches non-interference instead) is apparent, and most of the one-party state’s closest pals are also autocratic. Countries in the global south where democratic values are strong, such as Brazil, are unlikely to have a close cultural connection with China. What is more, as China draws nearer to the likes of Iran and Russia it risks allying with countries that want to destroy, rather than reform, the international order. Witness its recent nihilistic decision to cut a deal with the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels over shipping in the Red Sea and Suez Canal, instead of working on a common solution.
Meanwhile China’s economic reputation could deteriorate. The public support it won through its lending binge happened before the money needed repaying. Some 75% of its BRI loans will require the principal to be paid back by 2030. It is probably no coincidence that the share of Africans who see China as having a positive impact on its development dipped from 59% to 49% from 2019 to 2022, according to Afrobarometer. Mr Xi’s latest response to economic problems in China is to launch massive industrial subsidies which could lead to manufactured goods flooding the markets of other emerging economies. Though some consumers may benefit, another “China shock” may stunt the industrial ambitions of governments in the global south.
Even as China faces headwinds, new rivals are emerging whose influence in the global south is rising. India is the front-runner. By 2045, as its economic, diplomatic and military links increase, its influence over the global south will overtake that of Britain and France, and place it behind America and China, according to forecasts by PCIF. The number of Indian embassies in Africa increased from 25 to 43 between 2012 and 2022. It is the continent’s fourth-largest trade partner and fifth-largest source of foreign-direct investment, according to Mr Modi. India’s own Export-Import bank has lent $12bn across 42 African nations over the past decade, according to Bloomberg. Last year it held training exercises with armed forces from 25 African countries.
India also has a very different proposition on values. It sees itself as vishwaguru, or “teacher to the world”, in areas where it has specialisms. For example it is offering its “stack” of digital platforms—including biometric identity technology—to countries such as Ethiopia, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka. The Indian government is lending money to private hospitals to set up in Africa. And in November the Indian Institute of Technology opened its first campus abroad, on the island of Zanzibar, in Tanzania.
Some of India’s power is unquantifiable. As a flawed democracy with an ultra-pragmatic foreign policy (it has forged closer bonds with America at the same time as refusing to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine) it is closer to the median worldview among the G77 than is China. India’s pitch to lead is also substantively different. Because it worries more about a China-led Asia than an American-led world, it is inherently more pragmatic about its approach to reforming international rules. It wants to be a bridge to the West, not a battering ram.
Other countries have specialist claims to power. If China is a supermarket of influence then its rivals in the global south are like boutiques, offering other members a smaller range of bespoke goods. Gulf states are using part of their hydrocarbon windfalls on renewable-energy projects and mining assets in the developing world. Turkish firms are often the main rivals to Chinese ones for African infrastructure projects; they have laid rail tracks across East Africa, built the national stadium in Rwanda and airports in Senegal and Niger.
Brazil, the world’s second-largest agricultural exporter, is using its chairmanship of the G20 this year to promote food security in the global south. In February, Lula brought that message to the annual meeting of the African Union, the continental bloc. However ridiculous it may seem in parts of the West, South Africa sees itself as the de facto moral leader of the global south, taking Israel to the International Court of Justice for alleged genocide in Gaza, and leading a “peace mission” of African countries to Ukraine and Russia.
Lastly, America and its allies are not out of the game. Rich countries in the OECD group spend more than $200bn annually in overseas aid (loans make up most of China’s financing). Over the past 20 years American firms have spent $515bn in foreign-direct investment in the countries in the bigger BRICS bloc (excluding China), versus just $215bn from Chinese ones. Trade between sub-Saharan Africa and, in total, America and the euro area, is greater than that between the region and China, according to IMF data.
In addition to alliances such as NATO, America has defence partnerships with 76 countries. Western countries remain the preferred choice for economic migrants seeking a better life and elites looking to educate their children. The West is also trying to tackle its weaknesses. In 2021 the G7 outspent China in infrastructure commitments, reckons AidData. America’s Development Finance Corporation has as much as $60bn to spend on extending credit or buying equity in firms in developing countries. America and France want the World Bank to offer more cheap loans and investment in green technologies.
Ringside seat
China probably hopes to see off this competition. Yet even if it does, it will be the leading power in a group that will never be defined by cohesion among its members. In November Brazil’s Lula argued of the global south that “there are many more interests that unite us than differences that separate us.” In fact there are divisions everywhere. More than 40 countries have consistently abstained or supported Russia in UNGA votes about Ukraine. Roughly 8% of countries account for 78% of global-south emissions of the past 30 years. The interests of those middle-income countries awash with carbon-intensive energy sources, such as India and South Africa, are very different to those of poor countries which use little energy. One group wants money for a “just transition”; the other just wants more electricity to power its development.
Reducing Western influence at international institutions is a goal China and many others embrace. But the details soon get tricky. China is not going to welcome India permanently on to the UN Security Council; Brazil and South Africa regularly disagree at the WTO over agriculture; debtor countries and creditors like China want different things from World Bank or IMF reform. China will find that countries in the global south will pursue their national interests, and often come into conflict with the West, China—and each other. The global south, in other words, does not want a leader. It is a zone of contest. Just not one that can be located on a map. ■
